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ANALYZING FSA DIRECT LOAN BORROWER PAYBACK HISTORIES: 
PREDICTORS OF FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENT AND LOAN SERVICING 
ACTIONS 
 
1.     Introduction 
The U.S.  Department  of Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) helps  family 
farmers by providing credit to underserved borrowers, thereby filling credit gaps in the 
market. This financial assistance takes the form of guaranteeing conventionally sourced 
loans or granting direct loans so that credit is available to eligible credit-worthy, farm 
borrowers. A guaranteed loan is made by commercial lenders and FSA guarantees the 
majority of any  loan loss  that may occur. Direct  loans, on the other hand, are loans 
sourced by the U.S. Treasury and originated by FSA to farmers who do not meet the 
requirements for guaranteed loans. Both direct and guaranteed loans provide operating 
(OL) loans, which can be both short and intermediate term loans, and long term farm 
ownership (FO) loans.   
By providing  access  to  loans for  creditworthy borrowers, FSA seeks  to improve 
these borrowers’ financial well-being and ultimately, have them graduate to commercial 
credit sources. Supporting productive farms, which implies improvement in borrowers’ 
financial well-being, is the number one strategic goal of the FSA in their strategic plan 
for  years  2005-2011.
1  Financial progress can be measured by   favorable changes that 
occur in a borrower’s financial characteristics in comparison to his/her financial status at 
loan  origination.  In  addition,  with  improving  changes  in  borrowers’  financial 
characteristics, frequency of loan servicing actions should be minimal. 
                                                           
1 Farm Service Agency (FSA) 2005-2011 Strategic Plan, USDA. 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/fsa-strategicplanfy2005-2011.pdf. Accessed January 
19, 2009. ―FSA Strategic Goal 1: Supporting productive farm and ranches‖. 2 
 
In addition to furthering the financial well-being of farmers, FSA is mandated by 
Congress  to  allocate  various  proportions  of  loans  to  socially  disadvantaged  (SDA) 
farmers and beginning (BF) farmers. This mandate emphasizes a goal of including those 
who have been previously  underserved—SDA  farmers—and a  concern for the future 
generation  of  farm  operators—beginning  farmers.  SDA  farmers  include  women  and 
racial minorities as defined by FSA. Beginning farmers generally have ten or fewer years 
of farming experience with specific requirements differing between OL and FO loans. 
Different  loan  types  have  different  purposes.  Operating  loans  can  be  used  to 
purchase farm materials (e.g., seeds, fertilizers, and feeds) and equipment, livestock, and 
other farm operating expenses. Conversely, FO loans are used to purchase land intended 
for farming, for the construction of buildings, or for other farm improvements. Borrowers 
can apply for direct OL and FO loans to a maximum of $300,000 for each type of loan 
and $1,094,000 for combined guaranteed loans for fiscal year (FY) 2009. Loan maturities 
and interest rates vary according to the loan type and the borrower repayment capacity. 
Emergency  (EM)  loans  are  offered  only  as  a  direct  loan.  EM  loans  are  available  to 
farmers in counties that the President declares as a disaster area or that the Secretary of 
Agriculture declares as a quarantine area. EM loans can help farmers recover from farm 
losses due to drought, flood and other natural calamities. The maximum total EM loan 
indebtedness allowed per borrower by FSA is $500,000. 
2.    Study Objectives 
FSA screens direct loan applicants so that only those considered as creditworthy 
receive loans. FSA screens potential borrowers by examining many factors, such as past 
credit  experiences,  repayment  capacity  and  loan  security  (collateral),  prior  to  loan 3 
 
approval.  These factors are considered in projecting the likelihood that the borrower will 
be successful if the loan is made. However, because FSA direct borrowers are on the 
financial margin since they must first be denied credit by a commercial lender, they can 
have more difficulty paying their debts than commercial borrowers.  These difficulties 
are  reflected  by  loan  servicing  actions  such  as  loan  restructurings,  write  downs,  and 
delinquencies.  Occurrences  of  these  events  may  be  indicators  of  the  borrower’s  loan 
progress  and  ultimate  ability  to  pay  back  the  loan  or  to  default.  Other  gauges  of 
borrowers’  loan  progress  are  changes  in  their  financial  characteristics  like  farm 
profitability, solvency and liquidity.   
In this study, positive changes in net worth and current ratio and decrease in debt-to-
asset ratio are indicators of financial progress.  Even if the occurrence of loan servicing 
actions does not lead to default, they imply increased costs for FSA.  So minimizing their 
frequency is desirable.  By being able to predict the frequency of such actions, FSA could 
refine their evaluation of the likelihood of success and thereby assist borrowers’ through 
more effective screening and setting of loan terms. 
The objectives of the study are: 
   (1) To estimate how loan and borrower characteristics at loan origination are related to 
changes in borrower financial characteristics—net  worth, debt-to-asset ratio and current 
ratio—over approximately nine years. 
   (2) To estimate how the frequency and variety of loan servicing actions—restructurings 
and delinquencies—are related to financial and loan characteristics at loan origination.
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2 The number of write downs was recorded for each loan observation.  But write downs were 4 
 
3.    Related Studies 
Our  primary  interest  lies  in  predicting  how  characteristics  at  loan  origination 
influence subsequent financial well-being and number of servicing actions.  Most of the 
credit-related literature in agriculture relates to predicting the likelihood of loan approval 
and whether the loan is successful in terms of being paid back.  Our concern is looking at 
a more intermediate approach to loan success.  While FSA is strongly concerned with 
borrowers graduating from their direct loan program, part of evaluating borrower success 
is  continual  improvement  in  financial  health  and  minimal  loan  servicing  actions.  
Because we could find few studies specifically related to intermediate measures of loan 
progress, we look primarily to the loan approval/loan success literature for concepts and 
variables that predict borrower success during loan payback.  If such models are useful 
for  predicting  borrower  success  or  failure,  they  should  also  be  useful  for  predicting 
intermediate improvement in financial measures and loan servicing actions.   
Impact of Farm Structure 
Featherstone,  et  al.  (2005)  describe  changes  in  U.S.  farm  financial  and  physical 
structure over time that have motivated farmers to acquire loans. Capital substitution for 
labor and the consequent increased farm size has led to increasing capital debt. These, in 
turn, influence farm financial ratios.  Featherstone, et al., report a U.S. farm debt-to-asset 
ratio of 0.15 in 2002. Though this is relatively low, young farmers without much capital 
are likely to have higher debt-to-asset compared with older farmers. Return on assets 
(ROA), a measure of farm profitability, shows variable changes in U.S. farms from 1960 
to 2002.  To the extent these changes are due in part to increasing farm size; we would 5 
 
expect  measures  of  farm  size  to  be  important  in  explaining  financial  variables’ 
fluctuations. 
Factors Determining Loan Approval 
Katchova  (2005)  analyzes  farm  and  borrower  characteristics  that  indicate  the 
likelihood of a farm operator acquiring farm credit, the loan amount and the number of 
loans for U.S farms. Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS) farm level data 
are used in the study. Farmer personal information including age, education, off-farm 
income and the farmer’s risk attitude are used as personal attributes that influence credit 
use, loan volume and loan numbers. Farm attributes include the farm’s descriptive and 
financial characteristics. These include total farm acres, land tenure
3, contract use
4, debt-
to-asset ratio, total debt, gross farm income, return on assets, use of crop insura nce and 
government payments received.  
A probit model was estimated as a function of personal and farm characteristics that 
influence  whether  a  farmer  has  debt.  Farmer’s  attitude  toward  risk  significantly 
influenced whether  a farmer used  credit. Farm  attributes such as  gross farm income, 
government  payments,  contracts  use,  crop  insurance,  and  farmer’s  age  also  had  a 
significant impact on credit use.  
A truncated regression and Poisson models are used to estimate factors associated 
with determining the amount of debt and influencing the number of loans, respectively. 
Farmer’s age is the only variable that significantly affects degree of farm indebtedness. 
Whereas, gross farm income and use of crop insurance were the important factors that 
significantly affect the number of loans approved. 
                                                           
3 Land tenure is the ratio of owned to operated land. 
4 Contract use in Katchova’s study is the proportion of production under marketing or production contracts. 6 
 
Escalante  et  al.  (2006)  identify  significant  financial,  structural  and  demographic 
factors  that  influence  loan  approval  for  FSA  direct  and  guaranteed  loans.  Financial 
factors  considered  were  debt-to-asset  ratio,  return  on  assets,  net  farm  income  ratio, 
current ratio, asset turnover ratio and repayment margin ratio. Structural factors such as 
farm size, loan type (direct or guaranteed), and borrower’s region within the state and 
demographic factors such as borrower race and gender (whether female or not) were 
included as independent variables in a logit model predicting loan approval.  
Logistic  regression  results  of  the  credit-scoring  related  variables  show  that 
repayment  margin  ratio  and  current  ratio  are  significant  for  the  model  pooling  all 
observations. Repayment margin ratio is significant in both direct and guaranteed loan 
models. Return on assets and current ratio are significant in the guaranteed and direct 
loan models, respectively. In the models that segment observations by race, repayment 
margin ratios are significant for white borrowers and current ratio is significant for non-
white borrowers.  
Gender and region are significant factors for loan approval in the full-sample, loan 
application model and the direct loan model. Only two significant structural variables 
influence credit approval for non-white borrowers—farm size and region. For the white 
borrower sample, gender, direct loans and region are significant factors influencing loan 
approval. 
Featherstone et al. (2007) survey agricultural lenders in Kansas and Indiana. Their 
objective is to identify important borrower and lender characteristics that influence loan 
approval  and  interest  rate  levels.  Agricultural  lenders—commercial  banks  and  Farm 
Credit offices—received a hypothetical request for an agricultural loan as part of a survey 7 
 
instrument.  Each  loan  request  had  a  different  borrower  character,  financial  record 
keeping accuracy, ―productive standing‖, credit risk and Fair Isaac credit bureau score.  
Results from this study show that borrower financial and personal characteristics 
significantly affect loan approval and interest rate decisions.  Fair Isaac credit score is a 
significant determinant in loan approval and is inversely related to interest rate charged.  
Loan Performance Determinants 
Zech  and  Pederson  (2003)  identify  factors  that  can  best  predict  the  overall 
performance and repayment capacity of borrowers. Data on farm operators were acquired 
from  the Southwestern  Minnesota Farm  Business  Management  Association.  The data 
included  detailed  information  about  general  farm  characteristics,  balance  sheet  and 
income statement information, itemized enterprise data and the year-end-analysis of the 
farm  for  1987-1998.  Term  debt  coverage  ratio  (TDCR)  and  net  worth  growth  ratio
5 
(NWGR) are the two dependent variables  in the estimated regression models . TDCR 
measures  borrower  repayment capacity while NWGR  measures  the overall  borrower 
financial performance. 
Ordinary least squares model s  are  estimated to  explain variation  in  TDCR and 
NWGR for three six-year periods within the sample: 1987-1992, 1990-1995 and 1993-
1998. The initial set of explanatory variables contain s measures of liquidity, solvency, 
profitability, financial efficiency, repayment ability and other financial and demographic 
variables.  Explanatory variables in the final NWGR model are crop acres, equity-to-asset 
ratio, asset turnover ratio, net  farm  income ratio, living expenses and net nonfarm 
income.   Among those variables, asset turnover ratio has a positi ve, significant effect 
                                                           
5 Net worth growth is calculated as the change in net worth over a year divided by average total assets.  8 
 
whereas family living expenses turns out to be negatively significant to NWGR for all 
three time periods. Debt-to-asset is the only significant variable that influences TDCR for 
all three time periods and its influence is negative. 
Credit Score Migration 
Phillips  and  Katchova  (2004)  estimate  borrower  migration  rates  from  one  credit 
rating classification to another.  Their analysis examines the relationship of farm business 
credit migration and the business cycle. The existence of path dependence is also tested. 
A single, unconditional transition matrix was used to estimate the migration rates across 
different business cycles. The Markov property of independence
6 was tested for evidence 
of path dependence. 
Annual  (1985-2002)  farm-level  data  from  the  Illinois  Farm  Business  Farm 
Management Association (FBFMA) are used to estimate migration rates on the basis of 
the farmer’s calculated credit scores.
7 Based on the credit scores, farms were sorted into 
five classes. The study concludes that  credit ratings improve during upticks in the 
business  cycle  and  decline  during  general  economic  downturns.  Evidence  of  trend 
reversal—upgrades followed by downgrades or vice versa—is found.  
Success Measured as Graduation from FSA Direct Loan Program 
FSA direct loans are intended to be a transitory step for borrowers to guaranteed 
loans or conventional commercial loans. Dixon et al. (2007) analyze graduation rates of 
borrowers and their reasons for remaining in or exiting the FSA direct loan program. 
                                                           
6 Markov property of independence states that loan migration is independent of the previous migration 
outcomes. 
7 The credit scoring models use financial ratios as explanatory variables suggested by the Farm Financial 
Standards  Task  Force  (FFSTF).  Financial  ratios  measure  liquidity,  solvency,  profitability,  repayment 
capacity and financial efficiency. 9 
 
Data were obtained from  a survey where FSA farm loan managers obtained the 
actual data from borrower files at the county office level.
8 Observations were collected on 
three  types  of  direct  loans —OL  loans,  FO  loans  and  EM  loans.  A  borrower  was 
considered as exited from the direct loan program if they had no outstanding direct loans 
as of November 30, 2004, otherwise the borrower was considered to be an active FSA 
borrower.    Seven  different  types  of  exits  are  identified  and  condensed  into  three 
categories in the multinomial logit model: 1) continuing to farm without an FSA direct 
loan, 2) voluntarily left farming or retired, and 3) involuntarily left farming.  
Results from the multinomial logit regression model show that the numbers of active 
FO, OL and EM loans, debt-to-asset ratio, race and borrower age were significant for 
borrowers with active direct loans, i.e., borrowers that had not exited the FSA direct loan 
program. Borrowers who had received an FO loan show a 0.14 increase in probability of 
still being in the program. Financial factors like net worth, debt-to-asset ratio and the 
nonfarm income to gross cash farm ratio and the numbers of OL and EM loans at time of 
loan origination for the given loan are significant for continuing farmers using or not 
using conventional credit post graduation. Six variables are significant for borrowers who 
voluntarily left farming or retired and no longer had an active loan with the FSA. These 
are age, race, the loan being an FO, being a beginning farmer, debt-to-asset ratio and the 
number of EM loans held at loan origination. Number of FO loans held at origination, 
race and net worth were significant for borrowers who left farming involuntarily and no 
longer had active direct loans with FSA.  
 
                                                           
8 The present study uses the same data as those used by Dixon et al. (2007). 10 
 
4.    Methods and Models  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used to estimate models to identify those factors 
that influence the changes in the three selected financial characteristics. Because the two 
forms of loan servicing actions are reported as count data, the negative binomial count 
variable model is estimated. 
The Hypothesized Financial Variables Models  
Three financial variables are modeled in this study. These dependent variables are 
the  changes  in  net  worth,  debt-to-asset  ratio  and  the  current  ratio.  Changes  in  these 
financial measures are computed by dividing the difference between the most recently 
observed value of the variable and its value at loan origination by the number of years 
between the two observations.  The difference of the two given values divided by the 
number of years between observations gives the average annual change. 
There are many possible independent variables as indicated by the literature review. 
It is not possible to use all the variables used in past studies due to the limitations of the 
present data set.  These limitations are imposed in part by the data FSA collected.  Table 
1 shows a list of the independent variables used in the present study. Variables in this 
study are similar to those used by Nwoha, et al., since the same sample data are used.  
The  expected  signs  of  the  variables  are  given  in  Table  2.    In  general,  AGE  should 
improve  financial  measures  but  the  sign  expectations  on  GENDER  and  RACE  are 
ambiguous.  
Increases  in  the  financial  independent  variables,  except  debt-to-asset  ratio  and 
FINDIS, should increase net worth and current ratio and decrease debt-to-asset ratio. It 
was  felt  farm  type  should  be  important.    Conceptually  farm  type  was  measured  as 
revenue from crops (CROPREV) or from livestock (LIVREV).  For the debt-to-asset, 11 
 
current ratio and loan servicing models, the ratio of crop revenue to the sum of crop and 
livestock  revenue  (CROPREVR)  was  used.    In  general,  crop  farming  has  greater 
volatility in revenues. 
In  general,  variables  measured  in  levels  are  regressed  on  variables  measured  in 
levels.  Likewise,  ratio  variables  are  regressed  on  ratios.  An  exception  to  this  is  the 
numbers of concurrent direct loans at origination (NUMOL, NUMFO, and NUMEM).  
The observations on these variables tend to be small integers.  Other loan characteristics 
could influence changes in net worth and current ratio in either positive or negative ways. 
A borrower with FO loans has improving equity making net worth and current ratios 
increase and debt-to-asset-ratios decrease.  EM loans indicate a past disaster so their 
number should make financial indicators worse.  The sign effect of NUMOL could be 
positive or negative. 
Timing  variables  were  also  included  to  account  for  temporal  effects.    For  the 
financial  variables  increased  length  of  time  between  measurements  would  typically 
indicate the subsequent measurements taken in 2002 or later when agricultural income 
generally increased so that financial indicators should improve.  So TIMENW, TIMEDA 
and TIMECR measure the length  of time in  years between the measurements  of  the 
respective variables.   
Hypothesized Models Explaining Variation in Loan Servicing Actions 
As with the financial variables, the measurements on the loan servicing actions are 
specific to the borrower.  That is, the specific loan that selected the borrower into the 
sample is not necessarily the loan that received the servicing.  On the questionnaire the 
Farm Loan Managers (FLMs) were asked to report the number of loan servicing actions 
for the borrower on all FSA direct loans between October 1, 1996 and November 2004.  12 
 
Independent variables for explaining loan servicing actions are largely the same as 
with the change in net worth models. However, the signs of the independent variables are 
often  expected  to  be  the  opposite  unless  the  signs  are  ambiguous.  Financial 
characteristics such as NETWORTH and NONFINC should be inversely related to loan 
servicing  actions.  Conversely,  we  expect  that  CROPREVR  could  have  a  positive 
influence of loan servicing actions. Crop revenues are volatile and this could influence 
the ability to make payments as scheduled. As for loan characteristics, the numbers of 
concurrent direct loans are expected to be directly related to loan servicing actions. 
The  length  of  time  a  borrower  is  in  the  direct  loan  program  is  crucial  for  loan 
servicing actions since the longer they are in, the more likely they are to experience a 
loan  servicing.    The  variable  TIMETO  measures  the  time  from  loan  origination  to 
October 1, 1996.  Ceteris paribus, a relatively early loan should indicate a quicker exit 
from direct loan programs and fewer loans servicing actions post October 1, 1996. 
5.    Data Sources 
The observational unit is the borrower associated with a particular loan.  There were 
a total  of 34,026 OL, 3,083 FO  and 8,358 EM loans originated over  FY 1994-1996 
(Nwoha, et al.). White males made up the vast majority of FSA direct loan borrowers. 
Because they were the most numerous borrowers, loans to them were sampled at a rate of 
1  in  18  for  both  OL  and  EM  loans.  Regardless  of  gender  and  race,  FO  loans  were 
sampled at a rate of 1 in 9.  The FSA FLMs were surveyed through an online instrument 
that was posted on the secured FSA intranet site. The instrument was  designed by a 
research team at the University of Arkansas but was administered by FSA in Washington, 
D.C.     13 
 
FSA direct  loans originated in  FY 1994-1996 were sampled from  the  states  and 
territories such as Puerto Rico. Borrowers’ personal and loan information was collected 
by the FLMs based on a stratified, systematic sampling of loans. Three fiscal years were 
selected  to  prevent  the  unique,  macro  factors  of  one  year  from  disproportionately 
influencing  loan  originations.  The  FYs  1994-1996  were  representative  of  U.S.  farm 
income in the 1990s. FY 1994 represents the lowest and 1996 had the highest U.S. farm 
income in the 1990s.
9 
After  data  cleaning,  2,715  responses  were  considered  as  usable.  These  usable 
responses made for a 90% response rate from the total 3,004 sampled loans.   The data 
are of good quality because the responses were from the FLMs and many of these FLMs 
probably  exercised supervisory discretion when the original application forms were 
completed by the borrowers. Further description for the data collection and methods are 
discussed in Nwoha et al. (2005).  The actual survey instrument is included in Nwoha et 
al. (2005) in Appendix 2.B.
10 
For a given loan sampled, both data observed at loan origination and data observed 
subsequent to loan origination  were collected. Data on all the  independent variables in 
table 1 were observed as of origination of the loan selected into the sample except for the 
time variables.  The subsequent observation on a borrower’s net worth, current ratio and 
debt-to-asset  ratio  could  have  been  before  or  after  the  loan  that  was  selected  in  the 
original sample was paid off or not.  So, changes in these variables may be influenced by 
other FSA loans of the borrower in addition to the loan selected for sampling purposes.  
                                                           
9 U.S. Department of Agriculture. Data Sets: Farm Income – Summary Totals for 50 States. Internet site: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmIncome/50State/50STMENUXls.HTM.    Date  accessed:  March  24, 
2009. 
10  Farm  Service  Agency  Direct  Loan  Program  Effectiveness  Study.  Can  be  downloaded  at   
http://www.uark.edu/depts/agripub/Publications/bulletins/977.pdf. 14 
 
The subsequent values of net worth, debt-to-asset ratio and current ratio were observed at 
various points in time.  The observation points varied among borrowers and were not 
uniform.  The numbers of servicing actions (restructurings and delinquencies) were from 
October 1, 1996 until November 2004 and counted such actions on all direct loans held 
by the borrower during that time span.  
6.    Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics of the five dependent variables are displayed in Table 3.  The 
maximum change in net worth is $248,248 with a statistically significant (p = 0.000) 
mean value of $9,097. The mean value for the change in debt-to-asset ratio is 0.08 (p = 
0.0013). An average increase is somewhat unexpected.  Since FSA direct loan borrowers 
are typically younger than the population of farmers, an increasing debt-to-asset ratio 
might imply operators increasing the scale of operation through debt.  The mean change 
in  current  ratio  is  small  at  0.007  and  statistically  insignificant  (p  =  0.9021).  The 
maximum numbers of loan restructurings and delinquencies a borrower had are 72 and 
53, respectively. However, the sampled borrowers only have average restructurings equal 
to 2.3 and delinquencies equal to 1.8. 
Regression  results  from  the  two  sets  of  models  indicate  a  number  of  significant 
variables  but  most  of  the  regressors  are  not  significant  at  customary  levels  of 
significance. The variability in loan servicing actions is generally better explained by the 
models than variability in the financial indicators.   
Variation in the Financial Measures 
Results of the financial regression models are presented in Table 4. The overall fit 
for each of the nine models is significant at 0.01. Coefficients of determination are not 15 
 
high but this is not unusual for cross sectional data nor at large variance with those in 
Zech and Pederson who estimate similar models.  Sample sizes differ among loan types 
and the particular financial characteristic. OL loans have the largest sample sizes and FO 
loans are the smallest reflecting the preponderance of OL loans in the sampling frame. 
Observations with missing values on one or more variables in a model were not included 
in the regression sample.  Visual inspection of Tables 4 and 5 indicate that for a given 
dependent variable, say change in net worth, the coefficients differ by loan type so that 
estimation of separate models by loan type is clearly justified. The explanatory powers of 
the three financial measure models are higher than what was reported in Nwoha, et al. 
who included all loan types in each of the three financial measure models. Segmenting 
the sample by different loan types improves the explanatory power of the models.   
There  are  relatively  few  significant  variables  for  change  in  net  worth.  AGE  is 
significant for FO loans. The negative value (−564) on AGE is an unexpected finding. 
This means the older farmers generally accumulated less net worth per year (−$564) for 
each  year  older  they  are  at  time  of  loan  origination,  ceteris  paribus.  This  might  be 
indicative  of  younger  farmers  building  the  enterprise  while  older  farmers  are  cutting 
back.  But since this result is not evident in the other two loan type models, the finding is 
tenuous.  Livestock  revenue  (LIVREV) is positive and  significant  for  OL loans.   But 
LIVREV  is  not  significant  for  the  other  two  loan  types.  Net  worth  at  origination 
(NETWORTH) is significantly positive for FO loans but significantly negative for EM 
loans.  The negative association for EM loans may indicate the difficulty in overcoming a 
disaster.  TIMENW is significant and positive for both OL and EM loans supporting the 
notion that longer time spans captured part of more prosperous times for agriculture. 16 
 
Debt-to-asset ratio at origination (DA) is significantly negative for the change in 
debt-to-asset for all loan types.  This indicates that farmers with higher DA at time of 
loan origination generally experienced less of an increase in DA per year. The mean 
values of debt-to-asset at origination for OL and EM loan borrowers are 0.73 and 0.72, 
respectively. FO loans have a lower mean of 0.50.  Since the OL and EM borrowers are 
already at very high levels, we would expect FSA and other creditors to be reluctant to 
add debt since it would make an already perilous situation worse so the negative sign is 
believable.  The FO borrowers can handle additional  debt  more easily  but  there still 
appears to be a reluctance to add to an already high level of indebtedness. However for 
all farm borrowers, DA can only go so high before the farmer is technically insolvent, 
i.e., DA is equal to or greater than one. Therefore, farmers with DA near one are limited 
to how much the DA can increase. Number of EM loans (NUMEM) is positively and 
significantly related for the FO model. Alternatively, number of FO loans (NUMFO) is 
significantly  negative  for  the  EM  model.  For  OL  and  EM  loans  the  time  between 
observing the original and last observation on debt-to-asset ratio is significantly positive 
for OL and EM loans but negative for FO loans.  The unexpected positive signs might 
indicate that these borrowers are in the direct loan program longer and trying to build 
their operations by taking on more debt, whereas the negative sign for the FO model 
indicates the real estate asset secured by the FO loan had more opportunity to appreciate 
in value resulting in lower debt-to-asset ratio. 
For the change in current ratio, RACE has a negative, significant effect on OL loans. 
This indicates that non-white borrowers have less short term liquidity improvement than 
white borrowers. Current ratio at origination (CR) is significant for all loan types for the 
change  in  current  ratio  but  unexpectedly  negative.  This  may  indicate  borrowers 17 
 
becoming less liquid because they were able to take on more debt and/or applied some of 
their liquidity toward a down payment associated with the loan origination.  Additionally, 
highly  liquid  borrowers  may  find  it  advantageous  to  be  less  liquid.  TIMECR  is 
insignificant which is expected given that the observed current ratios changed so little as 
evident in Table 3. 
Across the three models, the patterns present  in the insignificant  variables show 
some surprising findings. Demographics, particularly GENDER, are not significant in 
this  model.  Programmatic  (BF,  SDA,  and  BFS)  variables  are  not  significant.  This 
suggests  that  changes  in  financial  characteristics  are  not  influenced  by  special  loan 
programs. Both special program and regular borrowers appear to be on an equal footing 
in improving their financial status. This can be viewed as a form of success for these 
programs since special program borrowers are being put in neither an advantageous nor 
disadvantageous  situation  in  regards  to  financial  improvement  vis-à-vis  non  program 
participants. The numbers of EM, OL, and FO loans in general did not significantly affect 
the changes in financial characteristics for all types of loans.
11 This differs from Dixon, et 
al. who found number of existing direct loans to  increase the likelihood that borrowers 
remain in the direct loan program. 
Variation in Loan Servicing Actions 
The estimated coefficients of the negative binomial for loan servicing actions are 
displayed  in  Table  5.  Negative  binomial  regression  is  used  instead  of  the  Poisson 
regression because of the over-dispersion of the data. We used the customary negative 
binomial model of Cameron and Trivedi (1986). The overall fits of all these models are 
                                                           
11 Only two of 27 coefficients were significant.  The magnitudes of the significant coefficients suggest a 
minimal impact. 18 
 
generally better than those of the financial variables models. Both models are highly 
significant as measured by the likelihood ratio statistic (χ
2). The explanatory power as 
measured by the McFadden pseudo R
2 for the loan servicing models are generally higher 
than the R
2’s in the financial variable models.  However, these two R
2s are not fully 
comparable.  
Other than sign, the parameters in Table 5 are difficult to interpret. So the marginal 
effects  are  presented  in  Table  6  which  gives  the  expected  change  in  the  number  of 
servicing  actions  for  a  one  unit  change  in  the  independent  variable  evaluated  at  the 
sample means of the independent variables.
12 Demographic and programmatic variables 
are not significant for loan servicing actions , similar to  the  changes in  the  financial 
variables models.  
Financial characteristics variables are significant for OL loans for both restructurings 
and delinquencies.  This does not hold generally for FO and EM loans. NETWORTH and 
total cash farm income (TCFI) are significant for OL loans.  Increases in NETWORTH 
imply fewer restructurings and delinquencies. The opposite is true with TCFI, indicating 
a farm size effect.   Additionally, increasing non farm income (NONFINC) is associated 
with more delinquencies for OL borrowers indicating th at financial stress may result in 
going off farm for more income.  As expected, a higher proportion of revenue from crops 
results in more restructurings and delinquencies for OL loans.  A similar effect is not 
found for FO and EM loans. 
Increases  in  NUMOL  or  NUMEM   significantly  increase  the  number  of 
restructurings and delinquencies except for restructurings by FO borrowers. Dixon et al. 
                                                           
12 See Greene (2007) for more discussion of marginal effects. 19 
 
(2007)  found  that  increasing  numbers  of  direct  loans  existing  at  the  time  of  loan 
origination implied the borrower was less likely to graduate from the FSA direct loan 
program.  
The FO and EM loan models do not have nearly as many significant variables as the 
OL models.  This may be due to diminished sample sizes compared with OL loans.  It is 
interesting that the amount of time from origination to October 1, 1996 (TIMETO), is 
negative and significant for EM loans.  This probably reflects that the earlier an EM loan 
was made, the sooner, on the average, a borrower pays back the loan and therefore would 
be less likely to have a restructuring or delinquency post 1996.  But a similar effect is not 
observed for OL or FO loans for restructuring or delinquency.   FO loans have longer 
times to termination than OL or EM loans (Nwoha et al. (2005)) so such borrowers are 
likely  to  be  in  the  FSA  direct  program  longer  and  therefore  more  exposed  to  loan 
servicing actions.  Borrowers’ originating OL loans on average have more FSA direct 
loans so may be more reliant on FSA direct loans and stay in the program longer.  
7.   Conclusion 
We  set  out  to  identify  variables  to  explain  changes  in  financial  well  being  and 
number  of  loan  servicing  actions.    Samples  to  estimate  the  models  are  composed  of 
observations of FSA direct loan borrowers who initiated OL, FO or EM loans in fiscal 
years 1994-1996. For both sets of estimated models the explanatory powers are about 
what  would  be  typically  expected  for  cross  sectional  data.    In  general  the  two  loan 
servicing models were superior to the three financial change models. 
The  estimated  financial  change  models  imply  that  different  types  of  loans  are 
influenced by different variables.  Changes in the debt-to-asset ratio and current ratio for 20 
 
all loan types were negatively related to the levels of these ratios at origination. The 
negative effect of the initial debt-to-asset ratio may reflect reluctance on FSA and other 
creditors’ part to make a marginal financial situation more perilous by extending more 
credit. We did find that the time spans between observations of initial and subsequent net 
worth  and  current  ratio  were  significant.    This  suggests  that  events  subsequent  to 
origination are important.  The latter part of the 1990s and early 2000s were not good 
overall for agriculture so this might be causing this effect.  Despite the lack of model 
explanatory power, simple statistical analysis showed significant, positive increases in 
mean net worth.  This indicates success for FSA direct loans. The mean debt-to-asset 
ratio increased, perhaps reflecting expanding enterprises for relatively young farmers or 
little to no debt for many FSA borrowers at time of loan origination. 
The  estimated  marginal  effects  for  loan  servicing  actions  implies  that  financial 
variables and the number of FSA direct loans at origination were important for borrowers 
getting OL loans. Increased borrower net worth decreases the numbers of restructurings 
and delinquencies for OL loan borrowers but larger farms as indicated larger gross cash 
farm income implies more loan servicing actions.  Additional numbers of FSA direct 
loans at origination imply increased restructuring and delinquency activity for OL and 
EM loans.  This finding suggests that too many existing FSA direct loans at origination of 
another loan may indicate a borrower who will be challenged to pay back loans. 
The fact that SDA and BF assistance types were not significant in any of the models 
indicates that changes in financial well being and numbers of loan servicing actions for 
such borrowers do not differ from non program borrowers.  This indicates SDA and BF 
programs are succeeding in helping such farmers compete evenly with other farmers.     21 
 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions 
Dependent Variables                        Description 
ΔNET WORTH  Average annual change in net worth ($). 
ΔDA  Average annual change in debt-to-asset ratio. 
ΔCR  Average annual change in current ratio. 
RESTRUC  Number of restructurings 
DELINQ  Number of delinquencies 
Independent Variables   
A.  Demographic 
AGE 
 
The primary age of the borrower (years). 
GENDER  Binary variable, 1 if female; 0 otherwise. 
RACE  Binary variable, 1 if nonwhite; 0 otherwise. 
B.  Financial Characteristics   
CR  Liquidity measure—current assets divided by current liabilities. 
DA  Leverage measure—total debt divided by total assets. 
NETWORTH  Solvency measure—total assets less total liabilities ($1000). 
REPAY  Repayment capacity—available balances to service debt divided 
by payments due in the current year. 
NONFINC  Non-farm income ($1000s). 
FINDIS  Binary  variable,  1  if  borrower  experienced  receivership,  was 
discharged in bankruptcy, or petitioned for reorganization under 
bankruptcy; 0 otherwise. 
TCFI  Total  cash  farm  income  from  crop,  livestock  and  other  farm 
income ($1000s). 
NETINCR  Net farm and household income divided by TCFI. 
LIVREV  Livestock revenue ($). 
CROPREV  Crop revenue ($). 
CROPREVR  Crop revenue divided by crop plus livestock revenue ratio. 
C.  Loan Characteristics   
NUMFO  Number of FSA direct farm ownership loans at origination. 
NUMEM  Number of FSA direct emergency loans at loan origination. 
NUMOL  Number of FSA direct operating loans at origination. 
BF  Binary variable, 1 if BF loan assistance code; 0 otherwise. 
SDA  Binary  variable,  1  if  SDA  farmer  loan  assistance  code;  0 
otherwise. 
BFS  Binary variable, 1 if BF and SDA farmer loan assistance codes; 0 
otherwise. 
TIMETO  Time from loan origination to October 1, 1996 (years). 
TIMENW  Time between initial and final observation of net worth (years). 
TIMEDA  Time between initial and final observation of debt-to-asset ratio 
(years). 





Table 2. Expected Signs of the Independent Variables 
 
Independent Variables 
Change per year in:  Number of 
Restructurings or 
Delinquencies 
Net worth  Debt-to-Asset Ratio  Current Ratio 
A.  Demographic       
AGE  +  –  +  – 
GENDER  +/–  +/–  +/–  +/– 
RACE  +/–  +/–  +/–  +/– 
B.  Financial Characteristics       
CR    –  +   
DA    +/–  +/–   
NETWORTH  +      – 
REPAY  +  –  +   
NONFINC  +  –  +  – 
FINDIS  –  +  –  + 
TCFI  +  –  +  +/– 
PCTHFINC  +  –  +   
LIVREV  +       
CROPREV  +       
CROPREVR    +/–  +/–  + 
C.  Loan Characteristics       
NUMFO  +  –  +  + 
NUMEM  –  +  –  + 
NUMOL  +/–  +/–  +/–  + 
BF  +/–  +  +/–  +/– 
SDA  +/–  +/–  +/–  +/– 
BFS  +/–  +/–  +/–  +/– 
TIMTO        – 
TIMENW  +       
TIMEDA    –     




Table 3. Dependent Variables’ Descriptive Statistics  
Dependent Variables        Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
∆NW            $9097
***a  $39,438  $–279,633  $248,248 
∆DA            0.065
***  0.802  –1.118  34.270 
∆CR  0.007    0.551  –6.547  6.659 
RESTRUC            2.266
***  4.780  0  72 
DELINQ            1.801
***  3.111  0  53 
a 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 








Net worth  Debt-to-asset ratio  Current ratio 
OL    FO  EM  OL  FO  EM  OL  FO  EM 
AGE  −42.2        −564.3
**b  −16.3    0.00    −0.00    −0.00    0.00    −0.01    0.00   
RACE  −16860.5    9264.6    1386.9    0.02    0.07    0.09      −0.43
*  −0.20         −0.00   
GENDER  −8282.5    −14907.3    9649.9    −0.01     0.07    −0.05    −0.35    0.17       −0.05   
CR              −0.00    0.01




DA              −0.10
***  −0.10
***    −0.12
***  −0.08
**  0.03    0.00   
NETWORTH  14.1                     95.7
***         −47.6
*                         
REPAY          −0.02    −0.02    −0.02    0.18    0.09    −0.00   
NONFINC  −21.1    169.1    145.3                         
FINDIS  −4815.3    −11189.0    11567.4    0.01    0.03      −0.11
**  0.04    −0.15    0.03   
TCFI  −29.4    170.3    134.1                          
NETINCR              −0.01    −0.00    0.03    −0.05    0.00         0.04
*** 
LIVREV              0.4
*  −0.2    0.0                           
CROPREV  0.0    −0.2    −0.1                         
CROPREVR              0.03    −0.00    −0.05    −0.04    −0.22    0.03   
NUMFO  −619.2    −724.8    −4609.6    0.00    0.01    −0.02
*  0.00    −0.02    −0.00   
NUMEM       1626.5    1523.4    −1145.8    0.02       0.01
**  0.00    0.02    0.03    −0.01   
NUMOL  −581.7    −313.6    −338.3    0.01    −0.01    0.00    0.00    0.00      0.01   
BF  −1359.7    3094.3        0.03    −0.01      −0.03    −0.23       
SDA  3650.3    −22.2        −0.01    −0.06      0.36    −0.17       
BFS  7545.1    −7540.2        0.08    0.01        0.38    −0.43       
TIMENW       3112.3
***  932.4    4392.3
***                         
TIMEDA               0.03
**   −0.01
*    0.01
*             
TIMECR                        0.00    −0.10    0.01   
n           1206        224       273    822    119    208    958    127    227   
F         8.45
***           3.43
***           2.51
***  2.48
***  5.36
***     4.48
***   23.49
***  2.32
***   12.11
*** 
R
2        0.10      0.21       0.11  0.05    0.46    0.23    0.29    0.25          0.43   
Adjusted R
2        0.09      0.15       0.07  0.03    0.37    0.18    0.27    0.14          0.39   
a Standard errors are computed by White’s heteroscedastic covariance matrix. 
b 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 







Table 5. Negative Binomial Estimates of Loan Servicing Actions 
Independent 
variables 
Restructuring    Delinquency 
OL    FO  EM    OL  FO  EM 
AGE  –0.0080         0.0529
*    –0.0284
**     –0.0032    0.0198    0.0008   
RACE  –0.1937    1.2224    –0.5558      0.3442    0.0950         0.4887
** 
GENDER  0.0220    1.5756    –0.7341      –0.1184    0.5058    0.4666 
 
NETWORTH      –0.0011
**     –0.0084
**  –0.0001         –0.0026
***  –0.0027    –0.0007 
 
NONFINC  –0.0036    –0.0131    –0.0016         0.0045
**  0.0103    0.0040   
FINDIS      –0.4604
** a  –0.5876    –0.2237      0.2671    1.0293    0.4395   
TCFI        0.0014
***  0.0050    0.0005         0.0008
**  0.0027    0.0004 
 
CROPREVR        0.4132
***  –0.0056      0.5967         0.2123
**  –0.0476    0.2041          
NUMFO        0.1315
***  –0.4172    0.0349
      0.0375    –0.2343         0.2445
** 
NUMEM        0.2387
***  –0.0238        0.2408
*      0.0819
*      0.5504
***    0.1495
* 
NUMOL        0.1836
***       0.7676
***      0.3395
***         0.0699
***    0.3750
**     0.1139
** 
BF  –0.0859    0.3133          –0.0720    0.1707       
SDA  0.4440    –1.3441          –0.0103    0.6173       
BFS  0.5393    –0.7414          0.1767    0.4433       
TIMETO  –0.0581  –0.0100      –0.3528
**    –0.0333    –0.2397       –0.3244
*** 
n  1451    255    360      1331    241             321   
χ
2  4680.7
***        341.6
***      676.9
***         1516.1
***        209.2
***         198.4
*** 
R
2b  0.45    0.36    0.40      0.23    0.23    0.16   
a 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 









Table 6. Estimated Marginal Effects of the Negative Binomial of Loan Servicing Actions 
Independent 
variables 
Restructuring    Delinquency 
OL    FO  EM    OL  FO  EM 
AGE  –0.0190    0.0376    –0.0313      –0.0058    0.0205    –0.0012   
RACE  –0.4265    1.4598    –0.5159      0.7369    0.1022    0.8332   
GENDER  0.0530    2.3776    –0.5860      –0.2071    0.6568    0.8377 
 
NETWORTH   –0.0027
**a      –0.0060
***  –0.0002       –0.0049
***  –0.0028    –0.0010   
NONFINC  –0.0086    –0.0093    –0.0018        0.0083
**  0.0107    0.0057   
FINDIS  –0.8999    –0.3223    –0.2239      0.5573    1.7978    0.7682   
TCFI     0.0034
***  0.0036    –0.0005       0.0014
**  0.0028    0.0005 
 
CROPREVR     0.9844
***  0.0040          0.6579       0.3918
**  –0.0494       0.2912   
NUMFO     0.3133
***  –0.2964 
         0.0384 
    0.0691    –0.2433      0.3488
   
NUMEM     0.5786
***  –0.0169        0.2656
*    0.1511
*     0.5715
**   0.2133
* 
NUMOL     0.4374
***       0.5453
**         0.3744
***       0.1289
***    0.3894
*     0.1625
** 
BF  –0.1990 
  0.2193          –0.1298    0.1753       
SDA  1.2822    –0.5898          –0.0190    0.8423       
BFS  1.6725    –0.4035          0.3544    0.5532       
TIMETO  –0.1385    –0.0071          –0.3890
**      –0.0615  0.2489      –0.4628
*** 
a 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
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